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TORT LIABILITY OF OIL COMPANIES FOR ACTS OF
SERVICE STATION OPERATORS
Since the advent of the automobile, travel by motor vehicle has been
ever-increasingly prevalent, and consumption of gasoline in the large amounts
so required' has necessitated the existence of a great number of retail service
stations,2 For various reasons the major producers of petroleum products have
thought, it desirable to retain some connection with the distribution of their
products until those products pass to the hands of consumers,3 and conse-
quently nearly all such major producers have established extensive systems
of retail outlets4 which sell only that producer's products and under its ex-
clusive tradenames.5 Because of the great number of these stations and the
nature of activity there conducted it is only natural that many injuries to
third parties6 occur as a result of tortious conduct on the part of operators of
1. In 1948 there were 41,151,326 registered motor vehicles and the consumption of
motor fuel in highway use was 30,460,641,000 gallons. THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK
OF FACTS 647 (1950).
2. There were 241,858 retail service stations in 1939. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES 907 (70th ed. 1949). The number is probably considerably larger at
the present time since gasoline consumption is now about 50% greater. See AUTOMOBILE
FACTS AND FIGUREs 62 (28th ed. 1948).
3. No doubt the chief benefit to be derived is that connection with the retail market
affords a necessary outlet for their products which they must have to insure profits
in other branches of the industry. See COOK, CONTROL OF THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY BY
MAJOR OIL CO-MPANIES '50 (TNEC Monograph 39, 1941). Other benefits are: advan-
tages of national advertising, price control, credit card systems and stabilized demand.
For enumeration of some benefits of chain store distribution see Fox v. Standard Oil
Co., 294 U.S. 87, 98, 55 Sup. Ct. 333, 79 L. Ed. 780 (1935).
4. These producers also maintain extensive systems of wholesale stations which
deliver the products to the retail outlets. Cases involving injuries resulting from wrongful
acts of employees of those bulk stations, usually resulting from collisions of trucks
engaged in transporting the company's products, raise legal problems much the same
as those involved in the cases which are the subject of this discussion. See cases col-
lected in Note, 116 A.L.R. 457, 462-69 (1938).
5. For discussion of the marketing system employed by the major producers see
COOK, CONTROL OF THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY BY MAJOR OIL COMPANIES 41-52 (TNEC
Monograph 39, 1941). The general practice is to lease service stations to operators on
a gallonage basis. Id. at 46. These leases are usually cancellable on short notice and
by this means operators can be coerced into following the company's direction. Id. at
47. This plan achieves the same results as those previously obtained by company owner-
ship and employment of salaried operators but has the advantages of shifting social
security taxes and placing the effect of retail price wars on the operators. Id. at 52.
Operation by "independent contractors" also shifts the burden of tort liability under
respondeat superior and avoids the incidence of other types of taxation. Note, 38 MICH.
L. REV. 1063 (1940). Despite the relatively small percentage of stations operated for
the company by salaried employees, only 1.6% of the retail outlets in seven western
states sold the gasoline of more than one company in 1948. See Standard Oil Co. of
California v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 295, 69 S. Ct. 1051 (1949), 3 VAND. L. REV.
156. The "requirements" contracts used in this scheme have recently been declared
violative of the Clayton Act and one company has been enjoined from enforcing them.
Ibid. Justice Douglas, in dissenting, expressed the belief that the holding will force the
company to buy out and operate the stations. 337 U.S. at 320.
6. Injuries also frequently occur to employees of retail stations and workmen's
compensation is often sought. These cases, too, necessitate a determination of the nature
of the relationship between the company and the operator of the service station since
workmen's compensation laws are interpreted to mean by the term "employees" only
"servants" under a master-servant relationship, thus not extending the remedy to
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those stations or their employees.7 And in view of the obvious fact that some
connection exists between the producer and the operator, and the fact that
the producer usually has a deeper pocket, it is not surprising that many
attempts have been made to hold the producer liable for injuries so resulting.
These attempts, usually based on a theory of the existence of a master-and-
servant relationship 8 calling into play the doctrine of respondeat superior,
have met with varied success.9
No doubt the variance of results in cases in which attempts were made
to establish the existence of a master-servant relationship is partially due to
differences in the operative facts; but, even allowing for this, there seem to be
marked differences of attitude among the courts as to what must be shown
to prove the existence of the relationship. For this reason it is desirable to
review the general rules to be applied in determining the nature of employ-
ment relationships before attempting to decide the proper legal effect oF
particular facts.
-When one person, wishing to accomplish a given result without doing
the work himself, hires another to do the work for him and reserves either
control or the. right of control over the employee's actions in accomplishing
that result, the relationship is said to be that of master and servant.10 And
the master is liable, under the doctrine of respondeat superior, for injuries
to third persons occasioned by tortious acts of the servant done within the
scope of the employment."x On the other hand, if the, employer, having no
independent contractors. HOROVTZ, WORK1MEN'S COMPENSATION 195 (1944) ; 1
SCHNEIDER, WORKMEN'S COmPENSATION LAws 178 (1932). For this reason workmen's
compensation cases will be cited herein, along with those involving injuries to third
parties, on points relating to the existence of a master-servant relationship.
7. If the company would be liable for a tort committed by the operator, the company
is liable for that tort if committed by an attendant hired by the operator with the con-
sent of the company; and consent may be implied if the nature of the employment
indicates the necessity of hiring others. Monetti v. Standard Oil Co., 195 So. 89 (La.
App. 1940).
8. Liability may be imposed on the company as lessor if the premises are leased
in dangerous condition. Tauraso v. Texas Co., 79 N.Y.S.2d 812 (Sup. Ct. 1948) ; accord,
Texas Co. v. Freer, 151, S.W.2d 907 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941) (alternative ground).
But cf. Brittain v. Atlantic Refining Co., 126 N.J.L. 528, 19 A.2d 793 (1941).
9. See Steffen, Independent Contractor and the Good Life, 2 U. or CHI. L. REv. 501,
520 (1935); Note, 116 A.L.R. 457 (1938); 1 OKLA. L. REv. 277 (1948); 20 TEXAS L.
REV. 385 (1942).
10. PROSSER, TORTS 473 (1941); RESTATEMENT, AGENCY § 2(2) (1933). The dis-
tinction between the relationships of "master and servant" and "principal and agent"
is of fundamental importance and trouble 'frequently results from confusion of the two
under one classification of "principal and agent." It may be briefly stated that an agent
performs juristic acts-those acts done for the purpose of effecting a change in the
principal's legal relation with a third person. A servant does only non juristic acts-
those done for the purpose of achieving some result other than a change in legal rela-
tions. For detailed explanation of this distinction see FERsoN, THE RATIONAL BASIS OF
CoNTRcArs 227-42 (1949); Ferson, Agency to Make Representations, 2 VAND. L. REV.
1, 2-7 (1948). The distinction is vital in that it eliminates any false impression that
the two relationships are inherently coexistent. They are not. For instance, an operator
of a filling station might be an agent of the company in so far as having the ability
to transfer title to products sold and yet not be a servant so as to impose liability in
tort upon the company under the doctrine of respondeat superior.
11. PROSSER, TORTS 475 (1941); RESTATEmENT, AGENCY § 219 (1933). Many
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interest in the manner in which the desired result is to be reached, hires
another to merely produce the desired result and retains neither control nor
right of control over the employee's actions in achieving the desired result,
the relationship is said to be that of employer and independent contractor,
12
and the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply,13 although liability
of the employer-may sometimes be predicated on other bases.14 The test, then,
of the applicability of the doctrine of respondeat superior is whether the
employer has reserved control or right of control over the employee's physical
conduct in the performance of the service bargained for.15
These rules are well settled as law, but difficulty often arises in deter-
mining, under the facts of a given case, whether or not such conitrol has been
reserved by the employer. Most courts agree that the existence of a master-
and-servant relationship is to be determined from all the circumstances, 16
and not just from express agreements between the parties,17 but courts seem
to disagree on the weight to be given to various facts which are somewhat
indicative of the true relationship.1 8
That this is true in the cases now to be considered is well illustrated by
two decisions in the same case'
9 handed down by courts of different levels.
2 0
reasons have been offered as possible bases for vicarious liability of a master. See BATY,
VICARIOUS LIABILITY c. 8 (1916). But the rule has been generally thought desirable on
broad grounds of policy. Douglas, Vicarious Liability and Administration of Risk, 38
YALE L. J. 584, 720 (1929) ; Laski, The Basis of Vicarious Liability, 26 YALE L. J. 105
(1916) ; Seavey, Speculations as to "Respondeat Superior," in HARVARD LEGAL ESSAYS
433 (1934) ; Smith, Frolic and Detour, 23 CoL. L. REV. 444, 456 (1923).
12. 1 MECHEMA, LAW OF AGENCY § 40 (2d ed. 1914); PRosSER, ToRTS 473 (1941);
RESTATEMENT, AGENCY § 2(3) (1933); Ferson, Liability of Employers for Misrepre-
scntations M11ade by "Independent Contractors," 3 VAND. L. REv. 1 (1949).
13. For discussion and criticism of the rule whereby an employer is not vicariously
liable for the torts of an independent contractor see Harper, The Basis of the Immunity
of an Employer of an Independent Contractor, 10 IND. L. J. 494 (1935); Morris, The
Torts of at Independent Contractor, 29 ILL. L. REv. 339 (-1934). The rule need not here
be defended or criticized; it is merely accepted as a settled legal doctrine.
14. Chapman, Liability for the Negligence of Independent Contractors, 50 L.Q.
REV. 71 (1934) ; Ferson, Liability of Einpolyers for Misrepresentations Made by "Inde-
pendent Contractors," 3 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1949) ; Morris, The Torts of at Independent
Contractor, 29 ILL. L. REV. 339 (1934); Steffen, Independent Contractor and the Good
Life, 2 U. oF CHI. L. REV. 501 (1935); Note, 39 YALE L.J. 861 (1930).
15. HARPER, ToRTs § 292 (1933); HUFFCUT, AGENCY 9 (2d ed. 1901); 1 MEcHEM,
LAW OF AGENCY § 40 (2d ed. 1914) ; PRosSER, TORTS 473 (1941) ; RESTATEMENT, AGENCY
§ 2 (1933). The test has been criticized by some as being too indefinite. Leidy, Salesmen
as Independent Contractors, 28 Mica. L. Rr-v. 365 (1930); Stevens, The Test of the
Employmcnt Relation, 38 MICH. L. REV. 188, 199 (1939); Teple, The Employer-Em-
ployee Relationship, 10 OHio ST. L.J. 153, 176 (1949); Note, 38 MIcH. L. REV. 1063,
1066 (1940).
16. See Gulf Refining Co. v. Brown, 93 F.2d 870, 873, 116 A.L.R. 449 (4th Cir.
1938); Brenner v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 236 Mo. App. 525, 158 S.W.2d 171, 175
(1942).
17. "[W]hile the contract may be of importance in determining what is the rela-
tionship, it is not the determining factor ... " Monetti v. Standard Oil Co., 195 So.
89, 93 (La. App. 1940).
18. Note, 38 MICH. L. REV. 1063, 1072 (1940).
19. Texas Co. v. Wheat, 140 Tex. 468, 168 S.W.2d 632 (1943), reversing 159
S.W.2d 238 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942).
20. Consideration of two decisions in the same case is appropriate because of the
comparison which can be made between attitudes shown by two courts faced with
exactly the same fact situation.
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The facts, while naturally not identical with those of other cases, are repre-
sentative of those usually present.
In Texas Co. v. Wheat 21 the following facts were presented. Plaintiff
slipped on some oil on the pavement in front of a service station and suffered
injuries as a result of the fall. In contending that the operator was a servant of
defendant oil company, plaintiff showed that defendant leased the station and
equipment to the operator under an arrangement whereby the defendant could
in effect terminate the lease at will.2 2 The lease also required the operator to
keep the station repaired and in a clean, safe and healthful condition. A contract
further provided that the operator was to purchase his requirements of petro-
leum produts from defendant, 23 and that he could use defendant's trade-
marks and trade names in advertising. The station was similar in appearance
to other stations selling defendant's products, being painted in defendant's
colors and equipped with large signs bearing defendant's trade name, and
also having a sign relating to a "Texaco Registered Rest Room," a feature
which was nationally advertised. The station attendants wore defendant's
uniforms. The operator testified that he sold at defendant's "suggested" retail
prices, that defendant had painted the station several times and had made
some repairs, that defendant's representatives inspected the premises from
time to time and made "suggestions" as to keeping it clean, that he voluntarily
attended meetings conducted by defendant at -which times he was instructed
as to proper operating methods and in particular as to how to keep oil and
similar substances off the pavement, and that he honored defendant's credit
cards. The contracts between the parties made no mention of these things,
and the operator testified that he complied with "suggestions" and "Instruc-
tions" voluntarily.
The Court of Civil Appeals24 reasoned that although the nature of the
relationship is determined by agreements of the parties, their acts within the
relationship might indicate implied or express agreements in addition to, or
contrary to, the written contract between them; and if those acts indicated
that the employer had in fact retained the right to control the employee a
jury might find the existence of a master-and-servant relationship not ex-
pressly created by the written agreement between them.25 Although the court
21. 140 Tex. 468, 168 S.W.2d 632 (1943), revers g 159 S.W.2d 238 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1942).
22. The lease provided for rent which, if charged, was so high as to prohibit
profitable operation of the station. This rent was reduced to a reasonable amount by a
"temporary" agreement which could be revoked by the company at any time.
23. This result may be reached through several devices. For instance, the operator
may be required not to deal in competitive products, to buy all his requirements from
the company, or to agree to buy a monthly or yearly volume in excess of any reasonable
expectancy of volume to be sold. CooK, CONTROL OF THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY DJY
MAJOR OIL CoPANIEs 47 (TNEC Monograph 39, 1941). These "requirements" con-
tracts have recently been held to violate the Clayton Act. Standard Oil Co. of California
v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 69 Sup. Ct. 1051 (1949), 3 VAND. L. REV. 156.
24. 159 S.W.2d 238 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942).
25. 159 S.W.2d at 242.
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implied that other factors present also suggested the existence of a master-
servant relationship, particular emphasis was given to the fact that the de-
fendant made "suggestions" with respect to. the operation of the station and
that these suggestions were complied with by the operator. The court said
that the jury might find from this, when considered in light of the fact that
defendant's power to terminate the lease at will was an effective means of
compelling obedience, that there existed an agreement.between defendant and
the operator that defendant was to have the right to control the operator in
the details of operating the station.26 Thus this court held that the contract
between the parties was only evidence of the true relationship which was to
be considered in light of what was actually done under the contract.
The Supreme Court of Texas reversed this holding,27 saying that there
was no evidence on which a jury might properly find a master-servant rela-
tionship. In reaching this conclusion the court gave greater weight to the
contract between the parties and less weight to the inferences which might
be raised by the acts of the parties and other circumstances. 28 Although the
court conceded that the defendant could, and did, compel the operator to
comply with its suggestions as to the condition in which the station should
be kept, it held that so long as defendant did not dictate the specific methods
by which the conditions were to be met it had not assumed such control as
to create a master-servant relationship. 29 This reasoning overlooks the fact
that the circumstances might indicate an agreement that the defendant was
to exercise such control if it wished, and that defendant could in fact exercise
whatever control it desired. 'lere failure to exercise complete control, if the
right is present, does not negative the existence of a master-servant relation-
ship.3 0
The facts of the Wheat case are essentially the same as those of most
26. "[C]ertainly the jury was entitled to consider the possible and contractual
permissible effect of the rent reduction letter in conjunction with the terms of the
written lease. It is apparent that The Texas Company, in effect, retained the right to
terminate Gossen's tenancy at will by the simple expedient of withdrawing the letter,
and thus place in effect a prohibitive rental rate. This circumstance in turn has a material.
bearing upon the nature of the 'suggestion' or 'instruction' which Gossen from time to
time received from representatives of The Texas Company. From the facts and circum-
stances of this case, as disclosed by the records, we are of the opinion that a jury
might have properly concluded that there existed between The Texas Company and
Gossen an agreement or understanding, expressed or implied, oral or written, or partly
oral and partly written, whereby The Texas Company retained the right to prescribe
the material details of the means and methods employed in the operation of the service
station involved." 159 S.VW.2d at 242-43.
27. 140 Tex. 468, 168 S.W.2d 632 (1943).
28. 168 S.W.2d at 635.
29. "But the company, as lessor, was interested in maintaining the good reputation
of the station, and it had a right, as a condition precedent to the leasing of the station,
to demand maintenance of such standards. It could enforce compliance with the con-
tract in the maintenance of these standards without creating the relation of master and
servant so long as it did not undertake to direct the details by which the results were
to be accomplished." 168 S.W.2d at 635.
30. See Joiner v. Sinclair Refining Co., 48 Ga. App. 365, 172 S.E. 754, 755 (1934).
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other cases raising the point,31 and the two opinions fairly represent the
difference of attitudes among the courts. A number of courts faced with
similar fact situations have decided in accord with the realistic attitude of the
lower court. 32 Other courts, like the Texas Supreme Court, have been more
impressed with what the expressed intention of the parties was with regard
to the relationship to be created.33 Some of these latter courts, however, were
presented with little or- no evidence bearing on the nature of the relationship
other than the written agreements between the parties.
It is true that no rules of automatic application can be set down as deter-
minative of the true nature of the relationship between an employer and an
employee. However, besides evidence of actual exercise of control there are
other factors which are considered to be especially indicative of the nature
of the relationship,3 4 and consideration of some of these factors is particularly
pertinent in the cases now under discussion.
31. For a group of facts compiled to represent the typical fact situation in these
cases see Note, 38 MicH. L. Rv. 1063 (1940). The facts of Texas Co. v. Wheat closely
parallel those selected by that author as typical.
32. Bieluczyk v. Crown Petroleum Corp., 134 Conn. 461, 58 A.2d 380 (1948);
Joiner v. Sinclair Refining Co., 48 Ga. App. 365, 172 S.E. 754 (1934); Becker v. Asehen,
344 Mo. 1107, 131 S.W.2d 533 (1939) ; Brenner v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 236 Mo. App.
525, 158 S.W.2d 171 (1942); Coffman v. Shell Petroleum Corp., 228 Mo. App. 727, 71
S.W.2d 97 (1934); Garnant v. Shell Petroleum Corp., 228 Mo. App. 256, 65 S.W.2d
1052 (1933); Greene v. Spinning, 48 S.W.2d 51 (Mo. App. 1931); Eason Oil Co. v.
Runyan, 158 Okla. 241, 13 P.2d 118 (1932); Gulf Refining Co. v. Rogers, 57 S.W.2d
183 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933); Crowder v. State Compensation Comm'r, 115 W. Va. 12,
174 S.E. 480 (1934); accord, Buck v. Standard Oil Co. of New York, 224 App. Div.
299, 230 N.Y. Supp. 192 (3d Dep't 1928) (a few aspects of the relationship set out in
the opinion); Texas Co. v. Freer, 151 S.W.2d 907 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941), 20 TEXAS
L. REV. 385 (1942) (holding on alternative ground-that lessor is liable because premises
leased in a defective condition).
33. Arkansas Fuel Oil Co. v. Scaletta, 200 Ark. 645, 140 S.W.2d 684 (1940);
Greiving v. La Plante, 156 Kan. 196, 131 P.2d 898 (1942) ; Brown v. Standard Oil Co.,
309 Mich. 101, 14 N.W.2d 797 (1944); Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Linham, 163 So. 839
(Miss. 1935) ; Rothrock v. Roberson, 214 N.C. 26, 197 S.E. 568 (1938) ; Cities Service
Oil Co. v. Kindt, 200 Okla. 64, 190 P.2d 1007 (1948), 1 OKLA. L. REV. 277 (1948) ;
Texas Co. v. Wheat, 140 Tex. 468, 168 S.W.2d 632 (1943), reversing 159 S.W.2d 238
(Tex. Civ. App. 1942). See Reynolds v. Skelly Oil Co., 227 Iowa 163, 287 N.W. 823
(1939) (no negligence shown); Hudson v. Gulf Oil Co., 215 N.C. 422, 2 S.E.2d 26
(1939) (no negligence shown). Cf. Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. Naramore, Tenn. App.,
M.S., Jan. 8, 1949 (unreported) (injury resulting from retail sale by bulk sales operator).
34. "In determining whether one acting for another is a servant or an independent
contractor, the following matters of fact, among others, are considered:
"(a) the extent of control which, by the agreement, the master may exercise over
the details of the work;
"(b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct occupation or
business;
"(c) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality, the work
is usually done under the direction of the employer or by a specialist without super-
vision ;
"(d) the skill required in the particular occupation;
"(e) whether the employer or the workman supplies the instrumentalities, tools,
and the place of work for the person doing the work;
"(f) the length of time for which the person is employed;
"(g) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job;
"(h) whether or not the work is a part of the regular business of the employer; and
"(i) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relationship of master
and servant." RESTATEM\ENT, AGENCY § 220(2) (1933). See Notes, 19 A.L.R. 226
(1922), 20 A.L.R. 684 (1922), 61 A.L.R. 223 (1929).
[ VOL. 3
One group of such factors relates to the custom of the community as to
the control ordinarily exercised in a particular occupation. As a general rule
unskilled labor is performed under the control and supervision of the em-
ployer, 35 while those engaged in an occupation requiring great skill and
knowledge less frequently subject themselves to the right to control of an
employer.36 While operating a filling station is not as strictly a nonskilled
occupation as others, it is not so skilled that an employer would seldom
reserve the right to control the operator's actions. Especially is this true since
the employer in these cases has a vital interest in the details of operation.
National advertising of a chain of stations tends to cause the public to asso-
ciate the conduct of one station (especially as to cleanliness, safety and cour-
tesy) with that to be expected of all others in the chain, and since retail sales
are such a regular and vital part of the company's business37 it would ordinarily
be extremely reluctant to relinquish all right to control the details of operation.
Another factor of some import is whether the employer supplies the
equipment 38 and place of work for the employee. 39 It is a legitimate inference
that one who supplies tools and instrumentalities of substantial value would
not likely give up all control of the employee's actions in using them,40 and
one who is unable to supply his own equipment would be more likely to
submit to control of an employer. Certainly such considerations do not lend
support to the existence of the relationship of employer and independent
contractor when, as is normally the case with filling station operation, the
employer supplies both the equipment and the premises.
35. "The statute, by the term 'independent contractor,' means to indicate a person
who . . . is independent of the service of the person who employs him. In thought, in
speech, and in matters of contract there is instinctively dissociated from such person
the usual cleaners and caretakers of public or private buildings. . . . [I]t would be
quite unfortunate to lift a janitress to the position of an independent contractor. .. ."
Curry v. Addoms, 166 App. Div. 433, 151 N.Y. Supp. 1017, 1018 (2d Dep't. 1915) ; see
Chicago, R.I. & P.Ry. v. Bennett, 36 Okla. 358, 128 Pac. 705, 707 (1912). See RESTATE-
MENT, AGENCY § 220, comment e (1933); Note, 20 A.L.R. 684, 745-50 (1922). Many
courts have spoken in terms of a test of an "Independent Calling." Note, 19 A.L.R. 226,
241-47 (1922). And this test has been suggested by some writers as preferable to the
"right to control" test. Leidy, Salesmen as Independent Contractors, 28 MIcH. L. REv.
365, 378 (1930) ; Wolfe, Determination of Employer-Employee Relationships in Social
Legislation, 41 COL. L. REV. 1015, 1035 (1941).
36. Cf., e.g., Kueckel v. Ryder, 54 App. Div. 252, 66 N.Y. Supp. 522, 523 (Ist Dep't
1900), aff'd, 170 N.Y. 562, 62 N.E. 1096 (1902); Ziebell v. Eclipse Lumber Co., 33
Wash. 591, 74 Pac. 680 (1903).
37. Whether the work is a regular part of the employer's business is also a factor
to be considered. See Texas Co. v. Mills, 171 Miss. 231, 156 So. 866, 869 (1934) ; Mc-
Farland v. Dixie Machinery & Equip. Co., 348 Mo. 341, 153 S.W.2d 67, 71, 136 A.L.R.
516 (1941); Walters v. Kaufmann Department Stores, 334 Pa. 233, 5 A.2d 559, 561
(1939); RESTATEMENT, AGENCY § 220(2) (h) (1933).
38. See Storm v. Thompson, 185 Iowa 309, 170 N.W. 403, 404, 20 A.L.R. 658
(1919) RESTATEMENT, AGENCY § 220(2) (h) (1933). For numerous cases giving weight
to the fact that the employer furnished the appliance necessary to the work as indicative
of a master and servant relationship see Note, 20 A.L.R. 684, 778-81 (1922).
39. See Texas Co. v. Mills, 171 Miss. 231, 156 So. 866, 869 (1934). Cf. Standard Oil
Co. of N.J. v. Naramore, Tenn. App., M.S., Jan. 8, 1949 (unreported) p. 12.
40. See Mallinger v. Webster City Oil Co., 211 Iowa 847, 234 N.W. 254, 257
(1931) ; Kelley's Dependents v. Hoosac Lumber Co., 95 Vt. 50, 113 Atl. 818, 821 (1921);
RESTATEMENT, AGENCY § 220 comment g (1933).
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Also of importance is the length of time for which the person is en-
ployed.41 Not only may it be said that a worker is less likely to subject
himself to the control of another as to the details of the work where the job
is to take only a short time,42 but also that an employer is less likely to
relinquish his right to control the activities of one employed by him for a
job of long duration. The normal inference in the filling station cases, which
usually involve prospectively continuous employment and exclusive devotion
to the employer's service, would seem to be that services were contracted for
rather than results-that the employer in such circumstances would normally
reserve the right to control.
A factor which is perhaps conceded greater importance in indicating
the true nature of the relationship than those previously enumerated is the
right of the employer to terminate the relationship at will or upon short
notice.43 Its importance derives from the fact that it constitutes a power to
control even in the minutest detail, which can be exercised at any time ;44 and
the reservation of such a power is strongly indicative of an intention to retain
the right to control. Some courts have gone so far as to regard the existence
of such a right to terminate as conclusive 45 but this does not seem to be the
general rule.46 Certainly this factor should be given great weight in the filling
station cases.47
On the other hand, such factors as wage payments on a commission
basis 48 and the expressed intention, ordinarily present, that the employer is
to have no right to control the employee's activities tend to indicate a rela-
tionship of employer and independent contractor. However, this method of
payment is not inconsistent with the relationship of master and servant ;49
41. See Standard Oil Co. v. Parkinson, 152 Fed. 681, 683 (8th Cir. 1907); Mur-
ray's Case, 130 Me. 181, 154 Atl. 352, 354, 75 A.L.R. 720 (1931) ; RESTATEM.SNT, AGENCY
§ 220(2) (g) (1933).
42. RESTATE-MENT, AGENCY § 220, comment f (1933).
43. See Industrial Comm. v. Hammond, 77 Colo. 414, 236 Pac. 1006, 1008 (1925);
Densby v. Bartlett, 318 Ill. 616, 149 N.E. 591, 593, 42 A.L.R. 1406 (1925) ; Messmer v.
Bell, 133 Ky. 19, 117 S.W. 346, 348, 19 Ann. Cas. 1 (1909); Cockran v. Rice, 26 S.D.
393, 128 N.W. 583, 585, Ann. Cas. 1913B, 570 (1910). See Note, 20 A.L.R. 684,
761-65 (1922).
44. See Murray's Case, 130 Me. 181, 154 Atl. 352, 355, 75 A.L.R. 720 (1931),
citing Franklin Coal & Coke Co. v. Ind. Comm., 296 Ill. 329, 129 N.E. 811 (1921).
45. See Bowen v. Gradison Construction Co., 236 Ky. 270, 32 S.W.2d 1014, 1017
(1930); Evans v. Dare Lumber Co., 174 N.C. 31, 93 S.E. 430, 431 (1917).
46. Note, 20 A.L.R. 684, 762. (1922).
47. Cf. Bieluczyk v. Crown Petroleum Corp., 134 Conn. 461, 58 A.2d 380, 383
(1948); Eason Oil Co. v. Runyan, 158 Okla. 241, 13 P.2d 118, 119 (1932); Gulf Re-
fining Co. v. Rogers, 57 S.W.2d 183, 186 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933).
48. Cf. Barton v. Studebaker Corp., 46 Cal. App. 707, 189 Pac. 1025, 1028 (1920);
Potchasky v. Marshall, 211 App. Div. 236, 207 N.Y. Supp. 562 (3d Dep't 1925) ; James
v. Tobin-Sutton Co., 182 Wis. 36, 195 N.W. 848, 849, 29 A.L.R. 457 (1923). Cf. RE-
STATEMENT, AGENCY § 2 20(2)(g) (1933).
49. See Riggs v. Standard Oil Co., 130 Fed. 199, 201 (C.C.D. Minn. 1904) ; Natchez
Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Watson, 160 Miss. 173, 133 So. 677, 680 (1931); Becker v.
Aschen, 344 Mo. 1107, 131 S.W.2d 533, 539 (1939); Dunbaden v. Castles Ice Cream
Co., 103 N.J.L. 427, 135 Ati. 886, 888 (1927); Note, 61 A.L.R. 223 (1929).
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and the expression of intention in the contract may be a mere sham, 50 having
no effect upon the actual arrangement between the parties, and being placed
in the contract only in an attempt to avoid the application of the doctrine of
respondeat superior.51
Another factor which has been urged as indicative of the true relation-
ship in these cases is a clause frequently inserted in the contract of employ-
ment which provides that the employee will indemnify the employer for any
loss, damage or liability resulting from operation of the station.52 Such clauses
have been given little, if any, effect in determining the nature of the true
relationship when the rights of third parties are involved. On one hand it
has been held that such a clause is not binding on a third party is so far as
it purports to relieve the employer of liability if he is otherwise liable because
he has in fact reserved the right to control.5 3 Other courts have held that
such a clause does not indicate that the employer realized himself to be a
master and thus inserted the clause.
54
As previously stated, no hard and fast rule of automatic application can
be set down as determinative of the existence of such right of control in an
employer as to call into play the doctrine of respondeat superior. However,
there are certain factors which should be realistically considered by a court
attempting to determine the nature of the relationship between an oil com-
pany and an operator of its retail filling station. Some of these are: (1) the
fact that a right to control may arise by means other than express written
agreements between the parties. (2) the fact that the company has much
incentive for retaining the right of control, and (3) the fact that the company
usually has the actual power to compel compliance with any desired exercise
of control.
Even if no relationship of master and servant is found between the
company and the operator, the company under some circumstances may
nevertheless be liable. These possibilities of liability in general fall into two
broad categories: liability under the doctrine of apparent employment ;55 and
50. Several cases have referred to these contracts as "shams" or "subterfuges."
See Greene v. Spinning, 48 S.W.2d 51, 58 (Mo. App. 1931); Gulf Refining Co. v.
Rogers, 57 S.W.2d 183, 185 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933).
51. Sec Eason Oil Co. v. Runyan, 158 Okla. 241, 13 P.2d 118, 119 (1932); Gulf
Refining Co. v. Rogers, 57 S.W.2d 183, 185 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933).
52. Because the employer can, at least in cases of an extended employment, relieve
himself of utlimate liability by the use of agreements such as this, it has been argued
that an employer of an independent contractor should be held liable to an injured third
party if he selects a financially irresponsible contractor, just as he would be if he did
not use due care to select a competent contractor. Morris, The Tort of an Independent
Contractor, 29 ILL. L. REv. 339, 344 (1934).
53. Garnant v. Shell Petroleum Corp., 228 Mo. App. 256, 65 S.W.2d 1052 (1933);
Buck v. Standard Oil Co., 224 App. Div. 299, 230 N.Y. Supp. 192 (3d Dep't 1928).
54. See Arkansas Fuel Oil Co. v. Scaletta, 200 Ark. 645, 140 S.W.2d 684, 689
(1940).
55. This concept is also frequently denominated "agency by estoppel" or "apparent
authority," but neither of these terms is believed to be as accurate and descriptive as
"apparent employment" since both "agency" and "authority" are terms more appro-
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liability based on the existence of some other relationship such as employer
and independent contractor.
When one person represents that another is his servant and thus causes
a third person reasonably to rely upon the care or skill of the apparent
servant, the person representing that a master-servant relationship exists is
estopped to deny, in an action for an injury resulting from the reliance, that
such a relationship in fact exists.5 6 This doctrine of apparent employment
has been utilized in several types of cases to impose liability, by application
of the doctrine of respondeat superior, upon one who has employed an inde-
pendent contractor. 57 All that need be shown, by the better view,58 is a repre-
sentation of employment, reliance upon that representation, and injury
resulting from that reliance.5 9 It is surprising that this theory has not been
urged upon courts in filling station cases.5 0 Certainly the display of company
signs on and around stations, when considered in the light of national adver-
tising and extension of company credit cards which can be used in any station
selling the company's products, amounts to representations of employment
and control. And reliance upon the type of service and safety furnished by
a company's stations, which is exactly the result that companies spend millions
of dollars to achieve, is no doubt sometimes present.61 It would seem, then,
that this theory should be available to one injured as a result of his reliance.
As previously indicated, an employer may sometimes be held liable for
the torts of his independent contractor. 62 This rule has often been described
priately applied to a relationship looking to the doing of juristic acts-a relationship
distinctly different from that to which this doctrine applies. Cf. Ferson, Agency to Make
Representations, 2 VAND. L. REv. 1, 2-6 (1948).
56. Rhone v. Try Me Cab Co., 65 F.2d 834 (D.C. Cir. 1933), 47 HARv. L. REV.
344, 12 N.C.L. REv. 49; Rubbo v. Hughes Provision Co., 138 Ohio St. 178, 34 N.E.2d
202 (1941), 22 OHIo Op. 221 (1942); RESTATEmENT, AGENcY § 267 (1933).
57. The doctrine has been applied in a number of cases where the owner of a
building or department store leased space to an independent contractor. For discussion
and collection of cases see 47 HARv. L. REv. 344 (1933); 12 N.C.L. REv. 49 (1933);
22 OHIo Op. 221 (1942).
58. Some courts seem to consider it essential that a contractual relationship result
before the doctrine applies. See Friedman's Shop v. Yeater, 216 Ala. 434, 113 So. 299
(1927). But this would not seem to be the better rule. Any relationship between the
parties which entitled the injured party to rely upon the representation is sufficient
foundation for estoppel. Santise v. Martins, Inc., 258 App. Div. 663, 17 N.Y.S.2d 741,
742 (Sup. Ct. 1940); Getlar v. Rubinstein, 171 Misc. 40, 11 N.Y.S.2d 943 (Sup. Ct.
1939); 47 HARV. L. REv. 344 (1933); 22 Omo Op. 221, 224 (1942). Cf. RESTATEMENT,
AGENCY § 267 (1933).
59. RESTATEMENT, AGENCY § 267 (1933).
60. In Gulf Refining Co. v. Rogers, 57 S.W.2d 183 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933) plaintiff
alleged that he went to that particular station because he thought it was a Gulf Re-
fining Co. station in order to receive the service usually supplied by stations owned
and operated by that company, but the court found an actual master-servant relationship
and the theory of apparent employment was not discussed in the opinion.
61. The chief difficulty in invoking this doctrine lies in proving reliance, but the
difficulty would seem to be no greater here than in other types of cases in which the
doctrine has been applied. See cases collected in 22 OHIo Op. 221 (1942).
62. HARPER, TORTS § 292 (1933) ; PROSSER, TORTS § 64 (1941) ; Chapman, Liability
for the Negligence of Independent Contractors, 50 L.Q. REv. 71 (1934); Ferson,
Liability of Employers for Misrepresentations Made by "Independent Contractors,"
3 VAND. L. REv. 1 (1949) ; Morris, The Torts of an Independent Contractor, 29 ILL. L.
[ VOL. 3
as an exception to the rule that the doctrine of respondeat superior does not
apply to independent contractors,6 3 but it has .recently been urged that lia-
bility so imposed has a basis separate and distinct from that of the doctrine
of respondeat superior.64 Suffice it to say that under some circumstances the
employer may be held liable. It remains to be discussed, however, whether
circumstances such as are already recognized by the courts as imposing
liability may be present in the filling station cases.
One group of cases where liability has been imposed involve negligence
on the part of the employer in connection with the work.65 Thus the employer
is held if he does not use due care to select a competent contractor 66 or
specifies defective and dangerous plans67 to be used by the contractor in reach-
ing the result bargained for. While no filling station case has been discovered
which predicated liability on this theory it is not difficult to imagine situations
which might easily arise to which this theory might apply.
6 8
Another group of cases bases liability upon the existence of a "non-
delegable duty" on the employer so that he is negligent if he relies upon
another to discharge that duty and an injury results.69 The number of such
"nondelegable duties" is large and in view of a tendency of courts to broaden
the category 70 it is difficult to determine just what duties fall within the
rule. However, one duty which is well recognized as "nondelegable" is the
duty of a landlord to keep premises reasonably safe for business visitors.7 1
REv. 339 (1934); Steffen, Independent Contractor and the Good Life, 2 U. OF CHL L.
REV. 501 (1935) ; Note, 39 YALE L.J. 861 (1930).
63. Cf. HARPER, TORTS § 292 (1933); PROSSER, TORTS § 64 (1941); Morris, The
Torts of an Independent Contractor, 29 ILL. L. REv. 339 (1934); Steffen, Independent
Contractor and the Good Life, 2 U. OF Cnr. L. REV. 501, 503 (1935).
64. Ferson, Liability of Employers for Misrepresentations Made by "Independent
Contractors" 3 VAND. L. REv. 1, 5-7 (1949). That author asserts that the rational basis
for imposing liability upon, an employer for the acts of an independent contractor is
that when one bargains for the creation of an obvious and particular risk he should be
liable when the foreseeable injury occurs. Id. at 7. Also see Chapman, Liability for the
Ncgligcnce of Independent Contractors, 50 L.Q. REv. 71, 77 (1934).
65. HARPER, TORTS 645 (1933) ; PROSSER, TORTS 485 (1941).
66. Norwalk Gaslight Co. v. Norwalk, 63 Conn. 495, 28 Atl. 32 (1893); Baker v.
Scott County 'Milling Co., 323 Mo. 1089, 20 S.W.2d 494 (1929) ; Kuhn v. P. J. Carlin
Const. Co., 154 Misc. 892, 278 N.Y. Supp. 635 (Sup. Ct. 1935); Hamblen v. Mohr,
171 S.W.2d 168 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943). It has been argued that in many cases there
should also be a duty to select a financially responsible contractor. Morris, Tile Torts
of an Independent Contractor, 29 ILL. L. REv. 339, 344 (1934).
67. Starr v. Stanard-Tilton Milling Co., 183 Ill. App. 454 (1913); Burke v.
Ireland, 26 App. Div. 487, 50 N.Y. Supp. 369 (Sup. Ct. 1898); Hamblen v. Mohr, 171
S.W.2d 168 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943).
68. Those courts which allow the company to retain substantial control without
creating the relationship of master and servant might well impose liability upon the
company if it allowed the operator to maintain the station in an unsafe condition.
69. HARPER, TORTS 647 (1933); PRossER, TORTS 486 (1941); Note, 39 YALE L.J.
861, 867 (1930).
70. PROSSER, TORTS 486 (1941). For cases involving many types of "nondelegable"
duties see Note, 23 A.L.R. 984 (1923).
71. Aluminum Ore Co. v. George, 208 Ark. 419, 186 S.W.2d 656 (1945) ; Cannon
v. S.S. Kresge Co., 233 Mo. App. 173, 116 S.W.2d 559 (1938) ; Besner v. Central Trust




This rule has had some application in filling station cases. In Texas Co. v,.
Freer72 it was held that liability might be imposed on the company because
of a defective driveway which allowed gasoline to accumulate and resulted
in an explosion which injured plaintiff.
Another concept, closely related to that of "nondelegable duties," is that
involving "inherently dangerous" activities.73 This doctrine has not been
limited to cases involving activities which would be dangerous in spite of all
reasonable care and which would have imposed strict liability upon the em-
ployer had he engaged in the activity himself,74 but has been extended to
include any work in which there is a high degree of risk or some specific
danger.7 5 Thus in one filling station case liability was imposed on an oil
company for the death of a pedestrian who was struck by an automobile
driven by the operator of the station as he walked down the sidewalk in
front of the station.76 The court reasoned that operation of the station in that
particular place was inherently dangerous to pedestrians since normal oper-
ation required frequent driving of automobiles across the sidewalk.
The discussion has been concerned primarily with the various bases on
which liability might be imposed on the oil company. Some consideration
now needs to be given to the various defenses and safeguards which are
available to the company.
Of course, a company can avoid liability for injuries resulting from
retail sales activities by having no part in risk creation in that area. This
would necessitate severance of connections with the retail sales section of
the industry, however, and may be considered undesirable by the company.
72. 151 S.W.2d 907 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941), 20 TEXAs L. REv. 385 (1942). But c/.
Brjttain v. Atlantic Refining Co., 126 N.J.L.' 528, 19 A.2d 793 (1941).
73. HARPER, ToRTs 648 (1933); PROSSER, ToRTs 487 (1941); Morris, The Torts
of an Independent Contractor, 29 ILL. L. REv. 339, 348 (1934); Steffen, Independent
Contractor and the Good Life, 2 U. OF Cni. L. REV. 501, 503 (1935) ; Note, 39 YALE
L.J. 861, 865 (1930). For collection of cases see Notes, 23 A.L.R. 984, 1005 (1923);
21 A.L.R. 1229, 1243, 1265 (1922).
74. J.C. Carland & Co. v. Burke, 197 Ala. 435, 73 So. 10 (1916) ; Norwalk Gaslight
Co. v. Borough of Norwalk, 63 Conn. 495, 28 Atl. 32 (1893); City of Chicago v.
Murdoch, 212 Ill. 9, 72 N.E. 46, 103 Am. St. Rep. 221 (1904); Austin v. Bridges, 3
Tenn. Civ. App. 151 (1912). The leading English case on this point is Bower v.
Peate, 1 Q.B.D. 321 (1876).
75. E.g., S.A. Gerrard Co. v. Fricker, 42 Ariz. 503, 27 P.2d 678 (1933) (dusting
a field with poisonous insecticide); Vinton Petroleum Co. v. L. Seiss Oil Syndicate,
19 La. App. 179, 139 So. 543 (1932) (removing a decayed oil derrick). For other cases
see Note, 23 A.L.R. 1016, 1084 (1923). A number of cases have held an employer
liable for misrepresentation made by independent contractors hired to make representa-
tions. These cases have recently been explained on a basis similar to these "inherently
dangerous" cases. It is reasoned that when one hires another to make representations
in his behalf he creates an obvious and special danger that those representations will be
falsely or inaccurately made and the employer is liable if the foreseeable result occurs.
Ferson, Liability of Employers for Misrepresentations Made by "Independent Con-
tractor," 3 VAND. L. REv. 1 (1949). This theory might find some application in filling
station cases. For instance, if the operator sold a fluid, representing it to be kerosene,
and an explosion resulted because the fluid contained a high percentage of gasoline, the
company might be liable for injuries resulting.
76. Tauraso v. Texas Co., 79 N.Y.S.2d 812 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
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Even if a company chooses to retain some connection with retail sales
and thus to create risks in that area, the law allows it certain safegiuard§ if
it wishes to accept them. It can avoid the application of respondeat superior
by actually relinquishing control or right of control over the details of service
station operation and by making no representation of having that right.
Besides the safeguards available by choice the law also extends the
company other protection. In any event the burden is on the plaintiff to make
out his case and to prove negligence, causation and other elements necessary
to the particular theory of recovery. If the relationship created by the com-
pany is that of master and servant the company is liable only for injuries
resulting from acts done by the servant within the scope of employment.
77
If the relationship is that of employer and independent contractor, the com-
pany is liable only for foreseeable injuries resulting from a particular and
obvious risk inherent in the proposed activity; and even if such a risk is
created the company is liable only for negligence within the inherent risk,
and not for collateral negligence.7
8
All of these are valuable safeguards of the company's interests, but in
addition to them there is available another bulwark against ultimate liability
which is of even greater value. It is the right to require indemnity bonds of
all those who operate company service stations. In view of all these factors
no rational complaint can be made if courts take a liberal attitude in pro-
tecting the interests of plaintiffs who have no other protection than legal
processes.
WILLIAm[ T. GAMNrBLE
77. HARPER, TORTS 639 (1933); PROSSER, TORTS § 63 (1941); RESTATE-ENT,
AGENrcY § 219 (1933).
78. PROSSER, TORTS 488 (1941); RESTATEMENT, AGENCY § 426 (1933). This doc-
trine of collateral negligence performs in the employer-independent contractor field a
function similar to that of the "scope of employment" doctrine in the master-servant
field. Smith, Collateral Negligence, 25 MINN. L. REv. 399, 431 (1941).
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